1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	Adam Keats (SBN 191157) LAW OFFICE OF ADAM KEATS 303 Sacramento St., 2nd Floor San Francisco, CA 94111 Tel: 415-430-9403 Email: adam@keatslaw.org Attorney for Bring Back the Kern, Kern River Parkway Foundation, Kern Audubon Society, Sierra Club, and Center for Biological Diversity William McKinnon (SBN 129329) ATTORNEY AT LAW 952 School St., PMB 316 Napa, CA 94559 Tel: 530-575-5335 Email: legal@waterauditca.org Attorney for Water Audit California	
11	SUPERIOR COURT OF TH	E STATE OF CALIFORNIA
12		
13	IN AND FOR THE	COUNTY OF KERN
14		
15	BRING BACK THE KERN, WATER AUDIT CALIFORNIA, KERN RIVER PARKWAY	Case No.: BCV-22-103220
	FOUNDATION, KERN AUDUBON	
16	SOCIETY, SIERRA CLUB, and CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY,	MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
17		PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR
18	Plaintiffs and Petitioners,	PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
19	vs.	Fish & G. Code § 5937;
20	CITY OF BAKERSFIELD	Code Civ. Proc. §§ 526, 527.
	and DOES 1 through 500,	Complaint Filed: November 30, 2022
21	Defendants and Respondents.	First Amended Complaint Filed: March 6, 2023
22	Derendants and Respondents.	Hearing Date: September 6, 2023 Time: 9:00 a.m.
23		Dept.: 8
24		Judge: Hon. Gregory Pulskamp
25		
26		
27		
28		

1	TABLE OF CONTENTS
2	Table of Authorities 3
3	I. INTRODUCTION
4	II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
5	III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
6 7	IV. ARGUMENT
8	V. CONCLUSION
9	
10	
11	
12	
13	
14	
15	
16	
17	
18	
19	
20	
21	
22	
23 24	
25	
26	
27	
28	


1	TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
2	
3	Cases
4	Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vill. of Gambell (1987) 480 U.S. 531
5	<i>Butt v. State</i> (1992) 4 Cal.4th 668
6	Cal. Trout, Inc. v. State Water Resources Control Bd. el al. (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 5856, 7, 8
7	California Trout, Inc. v. Superior Court (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 1879
8 9	City of Los Angeles v. Venice Peninsula Properties (1982) 31 Cal.3d 28815
10	Continental Baking Co. v. Katz (1968) 68 Cal.2d 512
11	Envtl. Law Found. v. State Water Res. Control Bd. (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 844
12	<i>IT Corp. v. County of Imperial</i> (1983) 35 Cal.3d 63
13	Kern River Public Access v. City of Bakersfield (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 120515
14	<i>King v. Meese</i> (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1217
15	Kirzhner v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC (2020) 9 Cal.5th 966
16 17	Lands Council v. McNair (9th Cir. 2008) 537 F.3d 98114
18	Laurel Heights Improvement Assn. v. Regents of University of California (1988) 47 Cal.3d 37616
19	National Audubon Society v. Superior Court (1983) 33 Cal.3d 419
20	People v Stafford Packing Co. (1924) 193 Cal. 719
21	People v. Monterey Fish Products Co. (1925) 195 Cal. 548
22	Save Tara v. City of West Hollywood (2008) 45 Cal.4th 11616
23 24	SB Liberty, LLC v. Isla Verde Ass'n, Inc. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 272
25	Sierra Club v. California Bd. of Forestry (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 2999
26	Smith v. Adventist Health System/West (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 729
27	Summa Corp. v. California ex Rel. Lands Comm'n (1984) 466 U.S. 198
28	

	386088513
2	<u>Statutes</u>
	Cal. Code Regs. tit. 23 § 931-9379
	Code Civ. Proc., § 526
	Code Civ. Proc., § 527
	Fish & G. Code, § 13.5
	Fish & G. Code, § 33
	Fish & G. Code, § 43
	Fish & G. Code, § 6006
	Fish & G. Code, § 5937passim
	Wat. Code, §106
	Wat. Code, § 1243
	Other Authorities
	Public Trust Doctrine
	Constitutional Provisions
	California Constitution Article X, Section 214
	MPAs in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction Case No. BCV-22-103220 4

I. INTRODUCTION

The City of Bakersfield ("City") diverts water from the Kern River through its operation of six diversion structures or weirs on the Kern River: the Beardsley Weir, the Rocky Point Weir, the Calloway Weir, the River Canal Weir, the Bellevue Weir, and the McClung Weir (hereinafter the "Weirs"). See Exhibit 1 to Dec. of Adam Keats ("Keats Dec."), reproduced below:

The City fully or partly owns each of the Weirs. The City solely operates the Weirs, either on its



own behalf and/or on behalf of several contracting water districts.

The Weirs are all in excess of six feet in height, and therefore are all dams (Water Code, § 6003) subject to Fish and Game Code, section 5937. In almost all years, excepting years with exceptionally high flows, the City's operation of the Weirs diverts water in quantities such that sufficient water does not exist to keep in good condition any fish that may be found below all of the Weirs. In the vast majority of years, the Kern River is a bleak, dry and dusty riverbed devoid of fish.

This year is different. As of the filing date of this motion, snowmelt from the High Sierra continues to flow down the Kern River ("River") in such quantity that the City's diversions—as excessive as they are in most years—have not yet dewatered the River. As of the date of the filing of this motion, sufficient flows exist below each Weir to keep in good condition any fish that exist in the River. An injunction is required to preserve the status quo to ensure the City provides sufficient bypass to keep fish existing below the Weirs in good condition. Failure to provide sufficient bypass will result in fish being killed and their habitat destroyed in clear violation of the law.

The relief sought is narrowly focused. It does not seek to change the City's management of the Kern River allocations, but only to restrain the City from diverting water that is required to keep in good condition the fish that currently exist below each of the Weirs, a clear and unequivocal dictate of California law. (See *infra:* Fish & G. Code, § 5937; *National Audubon Society v. Superior Court* (1983) 33 Cal.3d 419 ("*Audubon*"); *Cal. Trout, Inc. v. State Water Resources Control Bd. el al.* (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 585, 626 ("*Cal. Trout F*").)

Fish exist in the Kern River, as demonstrated in the declarations in support of this Motion. The evidence proves that the City's diversions, if allowed to continue in their normal course, will inevitably result in the drying of reaches of Kern River. Fish will be killed and their habitat destroyed, causing incalculable damage to the public trust.

The title to and property in the fish within the waters of the state are vested in the state of California and held by it in trust for the people of the state. (*People v. Monterey Fish Products Co.* (1925) 195 Cal. 548; *People v Stafford Packing Co.* (1924) 193 Cal. 719.) Fish and Game Code, section 1600 provides: "The Legislature finds and declares that the protection and conservation of the fish and wildlife resources of this state are of utmost public interest. Fish and wildlife are the property of the people and provide a major contribution to the economy of the state, as well as providing a significant part of the people's food supply; therefore their conservation is a proper responsibility of the state."

MPAs in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction

The relief sought by Plaintiffs would collaterally address many of the City's violations of its duties under the Public Trust Doctrine, by reducing much of the harm the City's diversions of Kern River flows would otherwise cause to trust resources, including the River, its fish, birds, and its riparian habitat, as well as the recreational and aesthetic uses of the River by the greater Bakersfield community.

Section 5937 of the Fish and Game Code states: "The owner of any dam shall allow sufficient water at all times to pass through a fishway, or in the absence of a fishway, allow sufficient water to pass over, around or through the dam, to keep in good condition any fish that may be planted or exist below the dam." (Fish & G. Code, § 5937; See *Cal. Trout I., supra*, 207 Cal.App.3d 585, 626.)

Plaintiffs are extremely likely to succeed on the merits of their action. The chronically dry riverbed below each of the City's Weirs is prima facie evidence of the City's ongoing violation of section 5937 and of the City's violations of its duties under the Public Trust Doctrine. Such plain violations of clear legal mandates are given great weight in the Court's balancing of interests when considering whether to issue an injunction, leaving minimal weight, if any, to the City's interest in continuing its destructive dewatering of the Kern River. But even if the City's interests were given some consideration, they would be minimally impacted by the requested injunction: the City can change the point of diversion to a downstream location for all or most of the water it currently diverts, closer to the River's natural terminus, thereby providing commercial benefit without unreasonable harm to the public trust.

There is no reason for the City to be permitted to sacrifice the Kern River and its fish populations through its operation of the Weirs, and there is no reason for this injunction not to issue.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Section 526 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides several grounds on which a court may grant an injunction, including: "(1) When it appears by the complaint that the plaintiff is entitled to the

MPAs in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction

relief demanded, and the relief, or any part thereof, consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act complained of, either for a limited period or perpetually; (2) When it appears by the complaint or affidavits that the commission or continuance of some act during the litigation would produce waste, or great or irreparable injury, to a party to the action; ... (4) When pecuniary compensation would not afford adequate relief; [or] (5) Where it would be extremely difficult to ascertain the amount of compensation which would afford adequate relief." (Code Civ. Proc., § 526, subds. (a)(1), (2), (4), and (5).)

Code of Civil Procedure, section 527 states in the pertinent part: "(a) A preliminary injunction may be granted at any time before judgment upon a verified complaint, or upon affidavits if the complaint in the one case, or the affidavits in the other, show satisfactorily that sufficient grounds exist therefor." (Code Civ. Proc., § 527, subd. (a).)

"[T]he decision to grant a preliminary injunction rests in the sound discretion of the trial court." (*IT Corp. v. County of Imperial* (1983) 35 Cal.3d 63, 69, citing *Continental Baking Co. v. Katz* (1968) 68 Cal.2d 512, 527.) The superior court balances two factors when considering such a request: (1) the likelihood that the plaintiff will prevail on the complaint/petition, and (2) the interim harm that the plaintiff will face if injunctive relief is denied as compared to the harm that the respondent will face if the injunction is granted. (*IT Corp. v. County of Imperial, supra*, 35 Cal.3d at p. 69; *Smith v. Adventist Health System/West* (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 729, 749.) The greater the plaintiff's showing on one factor, the less need be shown on the other (so long as the court finds some possibility that the plaintiff will prevail). (*Butt v. State* (1992) 4 Cal.4th 668, 678; *SB Liberty, LLC v. Isla Verde Ass'n, Inc.* (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 272, 280.)

The language of Fish and Game Code, section 5937 is clear, plain and unambiguous, and the Legislature is presumed to mean what it said. (*Kirzhner v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC* (2020) 9 Cal.5th 966, 972; *Cal. Trout I, supra,* 207 Cal.App.3d 585, 599.) "Compulsory compliance with a rule requiring the release of sufficient water to keep fish alive necessarily limits the water available for appropriation for other uses. Where that affects a reduction in the amount that otherwise might be appropriated, [section 5937] operates as a legislative choice among competing uses of water." (*Cal. Trout, I, supra*, 207 Cal.App.3d at p. 601; Wat. Code, §§ 1243 and 106.)

Under section 5937, sufficient water must be maintained in streams "... to reestablish and maintain the fisheries which existed in them prior to its diversion of water." (*California Trout, Inc. v. Superior Court* (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 187, 193 ("*Cal. Trout II*")). Remedy can be accomplished by a simple reiteration of the statutory directive without quantification of the amount of water required to satisfy the direction. (*Cal. Trout II, supra*, 218 Cal.App.3d at p. 195.) The City has the duty to determine what is sufficient for supporting the life cycle needs of the existing fish. (*Sierra Club v. California Bd. of Forestry* (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 299.)

"Any consideration to determine the amount of water necessary to comply with the Fish and Game Code can be addressed by 'means of interim judicial relief."" (*Cal. Trout II., supra*, 218 Cal.App.3d at p. 200.) A good faith initial interim estimate of sufficient bypass flow will need to be properly monitored and measured. (Cal. Code Regs. tit. 23 § 931-937.) The interim estimate of sufficient flow must be adjusted over time guided by: credible science (Fish & G. Code, § 33); ecosystem-based management (Fish & G. Code, § 43); and adaptive management. (Fish & G. Code, § 13.5.)

III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The City owns or co-owns, and solely operates, six Weirs in the Kern River channel as it runs through the City. (Dec. of Adam Keats, Ex. 8, pp. 4-5 ["Request for Admission No. 4: Do you ADMIT that Bakersfield is an owner of the Beardsley Weir, Rocky Point Weir, Calloway Weir, River Canal Weir, Bellevue Weir, and McClung Weir? Response to Request for Admission No. 4: [Objection] Subject to and without waiving the foregoing objection, Bakersfield responds: Admit."; Keats Dec., Ex. 2, p. 0001019 ["[the City] assumed all rights, duties, and obligations with regard to the operation of the Kern River, the diversion of water into the headgates and canals off the river, and the record keeping function for the river."]; Keats Dec., Ex. 7, ¶ 30; Keats Dec., Ex. 3, pp. 0000379, 0000404; Keats Dec., Ex. 4, pp. 11-16, 44, (demonstrating ownership of Beardsley Weir, River Canal Weir, Bellevue Weir, and McClung Weir]; Keats Dec., Ex. 5, pp. 5-6 (demonstrating ownership of Rocky Point Weir); Keats Dec., Ex. 6 (demonstrating ownership of Beardsley Weir and Calloway Weir); see also Keats Dec., Ex. 1.)

The City diverts Kern River water through its operation of these Weirs on behalf of area water districts and on its own behalf. (Keats Dec., Ex. 2, pp. 0001019-1020.) The result is the near-total dewatering of the Kern River, particularly below the Calloway Weir. Since the mid-20th Century, "the vast majority of the flow of the Kern River between First Point and the Calloway Weir has been diverted away from the River, for agricultural use, resulting in a dry riverbed downstream of the Calloway Weir throughout most of the year." (Keats Dec., Ex. 3, p. 0000377)

Only "during very wet, high-flow conditions" does water usually flow in the river channel below the Calloway Weir. (Keats Dec., Ex. 3, p. 0000377; Ex. 7, p. 0000603, ¶¶ 68-69.) Before 2023, water was diverted to the California Aqueduct Intertie, which lies past the McClung Weir (the furthest downstream of the City's Weirs), on only seven occasions since the Intertie was constructed. (Keats Dec., Ex. 3, p. 0000416.)

This year, 2023, has been a very-high-flow year; high precipitation levels during the past winter and spring resulted in deep snowpack and very high River flows. (Dec. of William McKinnon) Despite the City's continued operation of the Weirs throughout 2023, sufficient flows have existed below each Weir to enable the River to flow past all of the City's Weirs. (Dec. of Matthew Mayry, \P 8; Dec. of Harry Love, \P 6; Dec. of Kelly Damian, \P 4).

On July 27, 2023, fish were observed and videotaped in a reach of the River upstream of the City, between the Rocky Point Weir and the Calloway Weir. (McNeely Dec., ¶ 4, Exs. 1, 2.) Expert opinion is that they are likely California hitch, a native species. (Dec. of Peter Moyle, ¶ 6, 8.) On July

27, 2023, fisherman Bill Ritchey caught a fish in the same reach of the River. (McNeely Dec., ¶ 7, Ex.
3.) Expert opinion is that the fish was a 1-2 years old adolescent large-mouth bass in good condition.
Bass is a common and popular California sport fish. (Dec. of Peter Moyle, ¶ 6, 8.)

On August 7, 2023, fish were observed in a reach of the River downstream of the City, between River Canal Weir and Bellevue Weir. (McNeely Dec., \P 9, Ex 4.) On August 5, 2023, dozens of fish were observed jumping further downstream, between the Allen Road and Stockdale Highway bridges, downstream of the Bellevue Weir. (Damian Dec., \P 5, Exs. 1, 2; Dec. of Peter Moyle, \P 7, 8)

IV. ARGUMENT

A. Plaintiffs Are Likely to Succeed on the Merits.

The first factor to be balanced by the Court in considering a request for preliminary injunctive relief is the likelihood of Plaintiffs prevailing on the merits. (*IT Corp. v. County of Imperial, supra*, 35 Cal.3d at p. 69.) As demonstrated below, Plaintiffs make an extremely strong showing that they will succeed on their claim that the City has and continues to violate section 5937 of the Fish and Game Code: (1) The City owns or partly owns each of the six Weirs on the Kern River named above, and controls the operation of each of them; (2) the City regularly diverts water from some or all of the Weirs in amounts that do not leave sufficient water in the River to keep in good condition fish that exist in the River below each Weir; and (3) fish currently exist in the River below the Weirs owned and controlled by the City. Plaintiffs will clearly be able to prove each of these facts, demonstrating a prima facie violation of Fish and Game Code, section 5937 and thus likely succeed on the merits of this claim.

1. The City Owns and/or Co-Owns, and Solely Operates, Each of the Weirs.

The City owns and/or co-owns, and solely operates, each of the Weirs that are the subjects of this action: the Beardsley Weir, the Rocky Point Weir, the Calloway Weir, the River Canal Weir, the Bellevue Weir, and the McClung Weir. (Keats Dec., Ex. 8, pp. 4-5; Keats Dec., Ex. 2, p. 0001019; Ex. 3, pp. 0000379, 0000404; Keats Dec., Ex. 7, ¶ 30; Keats Dec., Exs. 4, 5, 6.)

2. The City's Operation of the Weirs Leaves Insufficient Flows to Keep Fish in the River in Good Condition.

The City regularly diverts water from some or all of the Weirs in amounts that do not leave sufficient water in the River to keep in good condition fish that exist in the River below each Weir, evidenced by the fact that the River is dry below Rocky Point Weir in all but the highest-flow years. (See Mayry Dec. at ¶ 3; McNeely Dec. at ¶ 3; Keats Dec., Ex. 3 at p. 0000377; Keats Dec., Ex. 2, pp. 0001019-1020; See *Request for Judicial Notice, filed herewith, and Exhibits thereto.*)

3. Fish Currently Exist in the Kern River.

Fish have been observed, filmed, and caught in the stretches of the Kern River between Rocky Point Weir and Calloway Weir, between Calloway Weir and the River Canal Weir, and below the Bellevue Weir. (McNeely Dec., ¶¶ 4, 7, 9, Exs. 1, 2, 3, 4; Damian Dec., ¶ 5, Exs. 1, 2.) If the water is removed from the River, fish in these locations will not continue to exist in good condition. (Dec. of Peter Moyle, ¶ 8.)

B. The Harm Plaintiffs Will Face if Relief is Denied Is Greater Than the Harm the City Will Face if Relief is Granted.

The second factor to be balanced by the Court in considering a request for preliminary injunctive relief is a comparison between the harm that Plaintiffs will face if injunctive relief is not granted versus the harm that the City will face if the injunction is granted. (*IT Corp. v. County of Imperial, supra,* 35 Cal.3d 63 at p. 69.) Given the strong likelihood of Plaintiffs' success on the merits, the Court should not assign much weight to this factor, if any at all. (*Butt v. State* (1992) 4 Cal.4th 668, 678. *King v. Meese* (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1217, 1227 states: "[T]he more likely it is that plaintiffs will ultimately prevail, the less severe must be the harm that they allege will occur if the injunction does not issue. This is especially true when the requested injunction maintains, rather than alters, the status quo."

The harm sought to be avoided by this injunctive relief is harm to the public, making inappropriate the balancing of only the parties' interests. Herein the public interests must also be part of

the court's consideration. In a recently decided matter, the Fifth District Court of Appeal made this principle clear: "[R]igid application of the usual [balancing of only the parties' interests] would exclude harm to public interests from the balance of harm inquiry ... [however] ...the standard for granting injunctive relief involves balancing competing public interests - the harm if an injunction issues versus the harm if the [harmful act] is allowed to proceed. It is well established that when injunctive relief is sought, consideration of public policy is not only permissible but mandatory." (*Tulare Lake Canal Co. v. Stratford Pub. Util. Dist.* (F084228, Cal. Ct. App. (Fifth Dist.) 2023 WL 3860885, p. 12-13.)

Thus, this Court's inquiry should start and stop with the strong showing by Plaintiffs of the likelihood of their success on the merits. However, if any balancing is performed, the great harm to the public interest and the State's clear expression of prioritizing the health and good condition of the fish in its rivers requires a finding in favor of Plaintiffs. The facts show that Plaintiffs *and the public* will suffer significantly greater harm if an injunction is denied than the City would if it were granted.

1. Plaintiffs Seek to Preserve the Status Quo.

The general purpose of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo pending a determination on the merits of the action. (*Continental Baking Co. v. Katz* (1968) 68 Cal.2d 512, 528.) The current status quo is a flowing river with fish existing in good condition below the Weirs. This Motion thus seeks prohibitory, not mandatory, relief: preventing the City from taking an action that will change the status quo of the Kern River in violation of its duties under section 5937 and the Public Trust Doctrine.

Plaintiffs and the Public Will Suffer Great Harm if an Injunction Is Denied.

If an injunction is denied, past conduct establishes that the City will divert water from the Kern River in amounts that will lead to the dewatering of the River, resulting in the killing of all fish and the destruction of their habitat. The Supreme Court has found this type of environmental injury to be "irreparable." "[T]he Supreme Court has instructed us that '[e]nvironmental injury, by its nature, can seldom be adequately remedied by money damages and is often permanent or at least of long duration,

2.

i.e., irreparable. If such injury is sufficiently likely, therefore, the balance of harms will usually favor the issuance of an injunction to protect the environment." (*Lands Council v. McNair* (9th Cir. 2008) 537 F.3d 981, 1004, quoting *Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vill. of Gambell* (1987) 480 U.S. 531, 545.)

Plaintiffs do not seek to enjoin the City from all diversions; just diversions greater than required for the City to comply with its statutory mandate under Fish and Game Code, section 5937. The City can claim no right to diversions that would violate section 5937: "The right to water or to the use or flow of water in or from any natural stream or water course in this State is and shall be limited to such water as shall be reasonably required for the beneficial use to be served, and such right does not and shall not extend to the ... unreasonable method of diversion of water." (California Constitution Article X, Section 2.)

Without sufficient flows to keep in good condition the fish in the Kern River, fish will not be able to sustain life and fishing will not be possible below the Weirs. (McNeely Dec., Exs. 1, 2, 3, and 4; Damian Dec., Exs. 1 and 2.) But it will not just be the fishermen and the fish who are harmed. Birdwatchers, including members of Plaintiff Kern Audubon Society who regularly use the river corridor for birdwatching, will be deprived of being able to view water-dependent species, and those species will be deprived of much-needed habitat. (Love Dec., ¶¶ 7-8.) The interactive relationship between a healthy aquatic environment and a sustaining avian community can be seen by the images of egrets and blue herons, two species that exist in part by capturing small fish, attached to the Love Dec.

3. The City Can Deliver All or Most of the Water It Consumes and Is Contracted to Deliver to Other Agencies While Complying with Section 5937.

As set forth in Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint at ¶¶ 74-81, the end users serviced by the City's existing diversions by the Weirs can be serviced from diversion facilities located downstream. The City could continue to divert the small amount of water it uses for municipal purposes at its current diversion locations, while agricultural beneficial users could take their deliveries downstream, suffering

no or very little loss of water delivered. There would be very little change to water diverters and the City would benefit from a living watercourse.

The River's fish are not the only public trust interest engaged. Under the Public Trust Doctrine, the City may not divert water from the River without first "consider[ing] the effect of such diversions upon the interests protected by the public trust, and attempt, so far as is feasible, to avoid or minimize any harm to those interests." (*Audubon, supra,* 33 Cal.3d 419, 426.)_"All navigable waterways are held in trust by the state for the benefit of the public." (*Id.* at p. 434.) Water Code, section 1243 provides in part: "The use of water for recreation and preservation and enhancement of fish and wildlife resources is a beneficial use of water."

Because of the present high flows of the Kern River, the people of Bakersfield are enjoying the other benefits of a living river. While human benefits of recreational enjoyment may be subjective compared to the objective "keep in good condition" standard for the protections of fish under section 5937, the human public trust benefits of recreation are nevertheless also worthy of protection. The public's right to use public trust waters for recreational purposes is well established. (*City of Los Angeles v. Venice Peninsula Properties* (1982) 31 Cal.3d 288, 291(reversed on other grounds: *Summa Corp. v. California ex Rel. Lands Comm'n* (1984) 466 U.S. 198).)

"The public's right to use the navigable waters of this state are extremely broad and encompass the right to use rivers for all recreational purposes such as boating, swimming, fishing and hunting. (*Kern River Public Access v. City of Bakersfield* (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 1205, 1216 fn. 4 (citation omitted).) The public trust doctrine also protects the public's right to use, enjoy and preserve the Kern River in its natural state and as a habitat for fish. (*Envtl. Law Found. v. State Water Res. Control Bd.* (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 844, 857.)

Without sufficient flow of water, residents, neighbors, and members of the greater Bakersfield community will be deprived of a healthy, living, breathing, flowing river with all its benefits, including a place to picnic and cool off (Mayry Dec., Ex. 1), a river to jump into from a rope swing

MPAs in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction

(Mayry Dec., Ex. 2), and a cool, natural and wild place to swim. (Mayry Dec., Ex. 3.) The community will not be able to witness and observe the magic of fish jumping and feeding in the River. (Damian Dec., \P 5.)

Postponing environmental action can permit bureaucratic and financial momentum to build irresistibly behind continued infringement of the public trust, "'thus providing a strong incentive to ignore environmental concerns." (*Save Tara v. City of West Hollywood* (2008) 45 Cal.4th 116, 135, quoting *Laurel Heights Improvement Assn. v. Regents of University of California* (1988) 47 Cal.3d 376 at p. 395.) Delaying action until after the river has been dried again will "likely become nothing more than post hoc rationalizations to support action already taken" (*Laurel Heights, supra*, 47 Cal.3d at p. 394).

V. CONCLUSION

The City has a clear statutory duty under Fish and Game Code, section 5937 to allow sufficient water to pass over, under, or through each of its Weirs to keep fish below those Weirs in good condition. The city also has a clear mandate under the Public Trust Doctrine to protect trust resources, including the Kern River and its fish, birds, and habitat.¹

Accordingly, Plaintiffs request that this Court enjoin the Defendant City of Bakersfield and its officers, directors, employees and agents, and all persons acting on its behalf (collectively "the City") from operating the Beardsley Weir, the Rocky Point Weir, the Calloway Weir, the River Canal Weir, the Bellevue Weir, and/or the McClung Weir in any manner that reduces river flows below a volume that is sufficient to keep fish downstream of said Weirs in good condition.

For a comprehensive listing of public trust duties see Public Resource Code, section 6009.1.

DATED: August 10, 2023

DATED: August 10, 2023

LAW OFFICE OF ADAM KEATS, PC

Kes

Adam Keats Attorney for Bring Back the Kern, Kern River Parkway Foundation, Kern Valley Audubon, Sierra Club, Center for Biological Diversity

WATER AUDIT CALIFORNIA

William McKinnon Attorney for Water Audit California